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1. THE DUTY TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IS PREMISED ON A DISPUTE
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
As discussed in some detail in the Brief of Appellee (hereafter, "Rodgers'
Brief), in an appeal in which the appellant challenges the trial court's findings
of fact, there is a duty on the appellant to marshal all evidence arguably
supportive of the trial court's disputed findings, and then to point out the legal
flaw in the reasoning or logic connecting those facts to the trial court's Order.
(See, e.g., Scharfv. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). This usual
duty to marshal evidence is premised, of course, on an appellant's dispute with
the trial court's findings of fact.

A. Appellant Has Little, If Any Disputes With Minute Entry Order Facts

In the case now before this Court, the trial court issued a Minute Entry Order
dated April 15, 2008 ("trial court's Order" or "disputed Order") consisting of
19 sentences (R. 454-57). The trial court states that the Minute Entry decision
"will stand as the Order of the Court, granting Mr. Rodger's [sic] Motion for
Sanctions." Id.

Of those sentences, ten are introductory or concluding legal notes, or
essentially undisputed statements of fact (see disputed Order, including the
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first four sentences, the last five sentences, and sentence number eight: "As
indicated above [sic], Mr. Rodgers was not a party to the contract at issue in
this case"). (R. 455).

Six of the remaining sentences are simply statements of the absence of fact (7.
"there is absolutely no evidentiary support... "; and, 2. "In addition...the Court
can find no evidence... "; and, 3. "In addition, the Plaintiff has never
alleged... "; and, 4. "Simply put, the Plaintiff has never demonstrated... "; and,
5. "the Plaintiff clearly had no factual support... "; and, 6. "the Plaintiff had
absolutely no legal or factual basis..."). (Id.) It is axiomatic that Fay cannot
marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings of the absence of facts.
One cannot prove the non-existence of a negated point.

The remaining three sentences are disputed, to various degrees, but are
primarily statements of the trial court's largely unsupported legal conclusions.
As Fay argued in his Opening Brief, it is a practical impossibility to marshal
evidence that would arguably support otherwise unsupported conclusions.

Sentence six says: "Indeed, it is clearfrom the Plaintiff's opposition and his
Affidavit that he understood throughout these proceedings that Mr. Rodgers
was merely representing Global Travel Network" (R. 455). On its face,
dispute of this legal conclusion would call for a complete restating of Fay's
2

Opposition and Affidavit to ferret out precisely what it is that the trial court
found Fay to have allegedly "understood throughout these proceedings". Yet,
by the trial court's conclusion, in sentence six, the supposedly damning
evidence that establishes (in the trial court's view), the alleged fact at issue, is
contained somewhere in the entirety of Fay's Memorandum in Opposition and
Affidavit in Support. The trial court does not specify exactly what in the
Plaintiffs opposition and in his affidavit contributes to that conclusion. Fay is
left to either restate the entire documents, or simply refer to the documents, as
did the trial court.

Similarly difficult to marshal is the factual support for the trial court's
conclusion in sentence number twelve: "Overall, it is important to point out
that the Court is not dealing with a simple case of factual errors or
misstatements, which are clarified upon reflection or through the discovery
process." (R. 455). Fay is at a loss as to how he is to marshal facts to show
the basis for the trial court's conclusion that this is not "a simple case of
factual errors or misstatements...". Once again, he would be called upon to
prove a negative proposition, a challenging burden, at best.

Finally, Fay challenges the trial court's legal conclusion, in sentence fourteen,
that "[u]nder these unique circumstances, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff directly violated Rule 11 and that sanctions are warranted" (R. 456).
3

This legal conclusion is premised upon a brief summary of almost wholly
undisputed facts, and arrived at by leaps of logic that are not clearly supported
by the text of the disputed Order. One cannot very well marshal facts in
support of an unsupported legal conclusion.

Finally, one sentence is a mix of undisputed fact and a mystifying leap of logic,
which is without support in the record. Sentence sixteen states: "Further,
while he subsequently engaged counsel, it appears to the Court that he
continued to direct this action in most respects" (R. 456). The trial court fails
to explain where, in the record, evidence "appears" that makes that conclusion
logical. While Fay does not seek review of that conclusion, it remains that the
trial court's apparent certainty on an issue had no evidentiary support in the
record. Through the course of litigation in the trial court, covering more than
two years, Fay personally appeared in court only once, at the trial. No
defendant served any written discovery or took Fay's deposition. The trial
court fails to explain how it reached the conclusion it states above. Such facts
do not appear in the record.

Rodgers, in his zeal to convince this Court to sidestep Fay's appeal without
addressing the merits of the matter, accuses Fay of failing to construct the
mandatory "magnificent array of supporting evidence." (See Rodgers' Brief at
8, citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct.
4

App. 1991). He neglects, however, to specifically parse the disputed Order and
its repeated assertions of a complete lack of evidence on key issues. He also
fails to discuss, as did the trial court, the merits of Fay's claim against Rodgers
for his personal, individual acts in signing the settlement agreement.

B. Absence of ANY Ruling on Fay's Claims Against Rodgers, Personally,
Arising Out of the Signing and Dating of the Settlement Agreement
Fay presented two issues related to Todd Rodgers, as a defendant, to the trial
court for a ruling: the first involved Rodgers' relation to the fraud in the
telephone call from a Global Travel representative, which issue is the subject
of the trial court's disputed Order, as discussed, supra. The second issue is
against Rodgers, personally, in relation to his acts in signing and dating of the
Settlement Agreement, a personal act conducted by Rodgers individually. On
this second issue, the trial court remained silent.

The trial court simply ignored that issue, despite acknowledging (R. at 417)
receipt and review of Fay's opposition memoranda which specifically raised
the argument again, and noted the record evidence in support of the claims. (R.
at 371-376, and see R. at 430-33, copies of trial exhibits no. 1 and 19). Here,
even more clearly than in the unsupported conclusions of the disputed Order,
Fay's alleged duty to marshal the absence of facts is similar to the
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mathematical result of zero times zero; the result is zero. Where the trial court
does not issue any ruling, and avoids an issue entirely, the result is clear error.

Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the trial court's Order, as well
as the lack of ruling on Fay's request to consider the personal liability of
Rodgers in his actions in signing and dating the breached Settlement
Agreement, and reverse and remand for reconsideration.

2. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS, AS THEY ARE BASED ON SUPPOSITION AND
THEORY

The absence of facts, in the repeated assertions of the minute entry order that
there are no facts, is the heart of one branch of the contested result. The
finding of zero facts, where competent evidence was presented to the trial
court, is clear error. Where, as here, the appellant can show facts that the trial
court overlooked, ignored, or refused to address on entire issues in contest, and
evidence in support, the appeal is properly framed for consideration.

Again, there are two issues presented squarely on the question of clearly
erroneous factual findings in the court below, on this appeal: 1. the finding of
the absence of facts, as repeatedly asserted by the trial court on the issue of
Fay's reasons for naming Rodgers as a defendant in his fraud cause of action
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against Global, and 2. the absence of any ruling whatsoever, on the issue of
Fay's naming Rodgers as a defendant related to his signature and date on the
breached Settlement Agreement, (see, e.g., R. 371-76, and Order, R. 454-57).

The trial court's lack of findings, ruling, or statement of any sort on an issue
presented to it for ruling, is clear error. As the Utah Supreme Court has made
abundantly clear:
a trial court is required to make explicit findings of fact in support of its
legal conclusions. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1977). This
is particularly necessary in the Rule 11 area. The law requires that a
trial court make a series of specific factual findings as a predicate for
concluding that the rule has been violated... The trial court's findings and
conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly enough that an
appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review to each part of
the trial court's ruling." Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1995).
[Emphasis added].

Fay has shown facts, evidence, and logical connections that the trial court
failed to discuss or address, on the first issue, related to the trial court's
findings of "no evidence" in support of his claims. Further, the trial court
utterly failed to discuss, address, or affirmatively confront, in any ruling, the
issue of Rodgers' personal liability for his acts in signing and dating the
breached settlement agreement. Both such failures in the trial court's ruling
are fatal flaws in the trial court's duty to find facts and state them clearly,
particularly in the context of Rule 11 sanctions, and both are clear error, which
Fay requests this Court review and reverse.
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3. CORRESPONDENCE FROM RODGERS AND MADDOX
CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONFUSED UNDERSTANDING THAT FAY
HAD OF RODGERS9 STATUS IN RELATION TO GLOBAL TRAVEL

Rodgers argues the interpretation of evidence in his brief on this appeal,
rehashing issues that were presented to the trial court. The flaw in using this
forum to reargue the evidence, though, is that the trial court did not rule on that
evidence. The trial court negated the evidence, stating at least six times that no
such evidence is to be found in the record.

Rodgers, however, focuses on certain details of the letters at issue (Maddox to
Fay of February 22, 2005 (R. 509-510), and Rodgers to Fay of February 24,
2005 (R. 511)). These details that Rodgers discusses, however, are facts that
the trial court could have, but did not, address in its conclusions and rulings in
this matter. Rodgers seems to want to fill the alleged "void" in evidence that
the trial court repeatedly notes in the disputed Order.

Phrases in the body of both letters, however, could reasonably be taken to
establish the conclusions Fay reached in drafting his complaint, to the effect
that Rodgers had some substantial degree of control and responsibility for the
fraudulent activities of the telemarketers who called Fay's home, representing
Global Travel Network (see, e.g. Rodgers' statement to the effect that he may
seek Fay's assistance in a potential lawsuit he may file against third parties 8

which clearly implies that he has standing to sue on behalf of "his company",
Global Travel Network. R. 511).

Rodgers' insistence, in his Brief, on attempting to assemble what he sees as a
"magnificent array" of evidence supporting the trial court's findings, in truth,
simply belies the trial court's repeated statements to the effect that there is no
evidence supporting Fay's claims. In tfris appeal, Fay respectfully requests that
this Court review the clear error in the trial court's Order and reverse.

4. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER RULE 11 IS
SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS OF REASONABLENESS AND DIRECT
RELATION TO THE ACT IN QUESTION

Rodgers quotes Rule 11 correctly in his Brief, but then fails to discuss the most
relevant part of the quoted rule. He argues the merits of the inapplicable
portions of Rule 11, relating to directives of a non-monetary nature and orders
to pay a penalty into court. Neither portion of the rule is applicable here, as the
trial court did not to use either of those two options.

Rodgers pointedly avoids discussion of the two key phrases in the critical last
sentence of Rule 11(c)(2), a subsection specifically titled "Nature of sanctions;
limitations" [emphasis added]. It is the limitations that are relevant here,
including a restriction that an order of attorney fees or expenses be limited to
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"some or all of the reasonable attorney fees" [emphasis added], and that the
fees awarded must be incurred "as a direct result" of the alleged violation.

The controlling final portion of the relevant language is what allows imposition
of an order of attorney fees in favor of the allegedly aggrieved party. The rule
allows that a trial court may issue: "an order directing payment to the movant
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a
direct result of the violation." The text of Rule 11(c)(2), and the heading
describing it as a "limitation" on the court's sanction power, indicate that the
trial court has a duty to assess the amount of "reasonable" fees incurred, and
only grant recovery of some or part of such fees as were caused as a "direct
result" of the act.

These two limitations in the rule fit harmoniously with Fay's argument, by
analogy, in his opening Brief, to cases considering the measure of damages
under a breached contract. In both circumstances, the allegedly aggrieved
party has an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to limit the attorney
fees and expenses incurred.

Further, the black-letter tort principles of proximate and legal cause fit into the
equation, as well, in the use of the phrase "as a direct result" of the act to be
sanctioned. If the expense allegedly caused may have been cut off, by the
10

simple act of a defendant bringing an early, dispositive motion, for example,
under Rule 12, then it is his duty to thereby limit such expense. If he does not,
then it is the trial court's duty to limit the attorney fee recovery to such
"reasonable" amount which flowed "as a direct result" from the act that
offended the rule.

Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the award of attorney fees, if it
finds such an award appropriate, and remand with instructions to the trial court
to follow the clear directions of Rule 11(c)(2). In doing so, the amount of
attorney fees and expenses allowed to Rodgers, if any, should be limited to that
which flowed reasonably and directly from the act of naming Rodgers as a
defendant in the initial Complaint, and not include any amount that Rodgers
himself, and his counsel, could reasonably have avoided.

CONCLUSION
Appellant Fay respectfully submits his arguments, as stated above and in his
initial Brief, as well as any subsequent oral argument, in support of his request
that this Court review the Minute Entry Order of the Third District Court, the
Honorable Robert Faust, dated April 15, 2008. Plaintiff submits that this Order
fails to follow the direction of Rule 11, U.R.CivJP., and controlling cases
interpreting that rule, in that the Order fails to set forth, specifically and with
adequate detail, the ways in which the trial court found that Fay violated the
11

proscriptions of Rule 11. Further, the trial court neglected to take into account,
nor explain the absence of ruling, on Fay's arguments and evidence related to
Defendant Rodgers' personal actions in signing and dating the Settlement
Agreement at issue. Additionally, the trial court neglected to explain the
reasons for failing to address Fay's argument as to the lack of reasonableness
of Rodgers' claimed attorney fees and expenses, and the direct connection of
those amounts to the alleged violation of the rule.

Fay respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order of the trial court, and,
in the alternative, remand to the trial court for further findings and conclusions
in keeping with the requirements of Rule 11. Finally, Fay requests an Order,
awarding his reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting this
appeal, and in defending the Motion for Sanctions in the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

!L. Mouritsen
/ey for Appellant John Fay
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day of September 2009.
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